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Abstract
The well known Pareto criterion used in the context of efficiency
and welfare has to do with absolute changes whereas in every do-
main of economic behavior inequality or relative changes has become
a major concern. We propose an inequality-preserving or distribution
neutral Pareto criterion-the strong Pareto superior or SPS allocation
which preserves the initial distribution and makes everyone better off.
Our main result is that whenever there is a gain in the aggregate
value of the relevant attribute, there exists a unique counterfactual
allocation which is SPS.
Keywords Pareto Superiority, Strong Pareto Superiority, Inequality,
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1 Introduction
Pareto ranking or Pareto efficiency is a topic economists are exposed to very
early in their career. In particular the basic welfare comparison between two
social situations starts with the ranking in terms of a principle Pareto have
talked about in the nineteenth century. If we compare two social situations A
and B, we say B is Pareto superior to A iff everyone is as well of in B as in A
and at least one is strictly better off in situation B compared to A. This com-
parison is done in terms of utility or welfare levels individuals enjoy in A and
B. In the theory of social welfare this has been a widely discussed topic with
seminal contributions from De Scitovszky (1941), Samuelson (1958), Arrow
(1963), Stiglitz (1987), Sen (1970) and others to make recent treatments such
as Mandler (1999), Cornes and Sandler (2000) and many others.
Pareto’s principle provides a nice way to compare situations when some
gain and some lose by considering whether transfer from gainers to losers can
lead to a new distribution in B such that B turns out to be Pareto superior
to A, the initial welfare distribution. It is obvious that if sum of utilities
increases in B relative to A, then whatever be the actual distribution in B,
a transfer mechanism will always exist such that transfer-induced redistri-
bution will make B Pareto superior to A. The great example is how gains
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from international trade can be redistributed in favor of those who lose from
trade such that everyone gains due to trade. Overall gains from trade lead to
a highly level of welfare, under ideal conditions and therefore one can show
that under free trade eventually nobody may lose as gainers ‘bribe’ the losers.
But whatever it is Pareto ranking definitely does not address the inequality
issue. There will be situations where B will be Pareto superior to A, but
inequality in B can be much greater than A. The purpose of this short paper
is to extend the basic principle of Pareto’s welfare ranking subjecting it to a
stricter condition that keeps the degree of inequality intact between A and B
after transfer from gainers to losers, but at the same time guaranteeing that
everyone gains in the end.
Thus we coin a Strong-Pareto criterion which not only insists that ev-
eryone must be better of in B compared to A, but also requires that degree
of inequality must remain the same between A and B. Only then B will be
Strongly Pareto Superior (SPS) to A. Concern for such a Strong principle
stems from the fact that people do care about inequality and inequality has
become a worldwide popular point of debate in public domain (see Stewart,
2004; Stiglitz, 2012; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015, for further
readings).
Pareto superior move as such may not contain agitation to change policies
further because of rising inequality. We are also motivated by the query as
to whether the basic condition that guarantees Pareto superiority of B to A,
would also guarantee that B is SPS to A. Apparently it need not be since
there can be transfer that make B PS A, but that aggravate inequality.
We show that if total utility in B is grater than total utility of A, we
can always construct a counterfactual distribution C which is SPS to A. The
counterfactual allocation is obtained by taxing a subset of individual and
redistributing the collected tax to the rest of the individuals. In order to keep
the inequality level same we redistribute the aggregate gains proportionate
to that of individuals utility at the initial stage.
Section 2 describes the environment and the result. Last section con-
cludes.
2 Model
Consider an n (n > 1) agent society being observed for two time points. The
initial time point is denoted by 0, whereas the final time point is denoted by
1. The utility profile for the set of individuals at time t(t ∈ {0, 1}) is defined
in the following fashion:
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Ut = {ut1, ut2, ..., utn}, ∀t ∈ {0, 1} (1)
We assume that the individual utilities are cardinal. Furthermore, we also
assume that the individual utilities are strictly positive, i.e. uti > 0, ∀t ∈
{0, 1} and ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., n}.1 Let Dn be the set of all such n coordinated
utility profiles.
Pareto superiority (PS) is defined as the situation where no one looses
from the initial to the final period but at least one individual gains. However,
PS allocation may aggravate inequality. We thus introduce “Strong Pareto
Superiority” (SPS). By SPS we mean a situation where the utility of all the
individuals increases and the inequality also remains same, compared to that
of the initial distribution. In the present paper by inequality we restrict our
attention to the family of relative inequality indices of the form I : Dn −→ R
which are homogeneous of degree 0, i.e.,
I(u1, u2, .., un) = I(δu1, δu2, .., δun) ∀δ > 0 and δ is finite. (2)
In order to derive such a SPS allocation we first assume that their exists
a social planner who taxes a subgroup of the population and distributes the
collected tax to the rest of the population. Throughout this paper we refer
this phenomenon as a tax-transfer mechanism2. However, we also impose
an additional condition that such tax-transfer mechanism keeps the level of
inequality same as that of the initial distribution where the class of inequality
measures satisfies equation 2. We thus formally define the notion of SPS
allocations in the following fashion:
Definition 1. SPS allocation For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, and let Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn}
∈ Dn be the counterfactual allocation which is obtained from U1 following a
tax-transfer mechanism. Then Uˆ is said to be a SPS allocation to U0 which
is denoted by Uˆ SPS U0, if and only if uˆi > u0i and u0iu0j = uˆiuˆj , ∀i, j ∈
{1, 2, .., n}.
Note that if we scale up utilities of all the individual’s of the initial alloca-
tion by any positive scalar greater than 1, we necessarily get a SPS allocation.
1We make this assumption for mathematical simplicity. We can always allow an utility
function which takes negative values. However, in such cases we have to restrict the class
of utility functions that are invariant to any change in the origin of the utilities of all the
individuals belonging in that profile.
2Note that the tax-transfer mechanism is best understood if we consider income profiles.
In our context one can assume utility is an increasing function of income. Hence, the
gain(loss) of utility is also an increasing function of the amount of money received(paid)
as a transfer (tax).
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Nevertheless, such an allocation is not feasible if the aggregate utility of the
counterfactual allocation exceeds that of the final allocation. Formally we
define a feasible SPS allocation in the following fashion:
Definition 2. Feasible SPS allocation: For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, and ∃Uˆ =
{uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn such that Uˆ SPS U0, then Uˆ is said to be a feasible SPS
allocation if and only if
n∑
i=1
uˆi ≤
n∑
i=1
u1i.
A feasible SPS allocation may not be the most efficient. This is partic-
ularly when there is some resource left as a residual which can be further
redistributed amongst the agents to make every one better off. We define
the most efficient SPS allocation, among the set of feasible SPS allocations
in the following fashion:
Definition 3. Most efficient SPS allocation: For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, and
∃Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn such that Uˆ SPS U0, then Uˆ is said to be the
most efficient SPS allocation if and only if Uˆ is a feasible SPS allocation and
Uˆ is Pareto Superior to any other feasible SPS allocation.
We now characterize one important property associated with the most
efficient SPS allocation.
Lemma 1. For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, and ∃Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn such that
Uˆ SPS U0, then Uˆ is the most efficient SPS allocation if and only if
n∑
i=1
uˆi =
n∑
i=1
u1i.
Proof:
Only if
Let
n∑
i=1
uˆi 6=
n∑
i=1
u1i. Now if
n∑
i=1
uˆi >
n∑
i=1
u1i the SPS allocation is infeasible,
hence Uˆ is not the most efficient. On the other hand if
n∑
i=1
uˆi <
n∑
i=1
u1i, we
can always construct another feasible SPS allocation Zˆ = {zˆ1, zˆ2, .., zˆn} ∈ Dn
where zˆi = uˆi +
( n∑
i=1
u1i−
n∑
i=1
uˆi
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
u0i. Clearly Zˆ is Pareto superior to Uˆ which
implies that Uˆ is not a most efficient SPS allocation.
If
Suppose Vˆ = {vˆ1, vˆ2, .., vˆn} ∈ Dn be the most efficient SPS allocation. Hence,
Vˆ is Pareto superior to any other allocation including Uˆ . Given that both
Vˆ and Uˆ are SPS allocations they are related in the following fashion: vˆi =
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uˆi + κ.u0i where κ ∈ R. Now Vˆ being the most efficient SPS implies κ > 0.
Furthermore, a necessary condition for a most efficient SPS allocation is
feasibility which implies that
n∑
i=1
vˆi ≤
n∑
i=1
u1i =⇒
n∑
i=1
(
uˆi + κ.u0i
)
≤
n∑
i=1
u1i.
Now given κ > 0 =⇒
n∑
i=1
uˆi <
n∑
i=1
u1i, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We are now ready to introduce the main result of this paper. By SPS al-
locations we mean a counterfactual distribution which has same inequality as
the initial distribution and also is Pareto superior to the initial distribution.
Obviously such a distribution will never exist if there is aggregate loss in the
society. This is because the net loss must make at least one individual worse
off and eventually there does not exist any feasible Pareto Superior alloca-
tion. However, if there is a net gain any SPS allocation can be obtained by
taxing a subgroup of individual and transferring the collected tax to the rest
of the population. Our next result characterizes the most efficient allocation
and the associated tax-transfer vector. Formally:
Proposition 1. For all U0, U1 ∈ Dn, ∃Uˆ = {uˆ1, uˆ2, .., uˆn} ∈ Dn such that
Uˆ SPS U0 and Uˆ is the most efficient SPS allocation, if and only if
n∑
i=1
u1i >
n∑
i=1
u0i and the tax-transfer vector is T = {T1, T2, .., Tn} = {u11 − uˆ1, u12 −
uˆ2, .., u1n − uˆn}, and uˆi = u0i
( n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., n}.
Proof: Only if
Given Uˆ SPS U0 =⇒ ∃θ such that uˆi = θ.u0i ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., n} and θ > 1.
Now since Uˆ is the most efficient SPS allocation, following lemma 1 we can
write
n∑
i=1
uˆi =
n∑
i=1
u1i =⇒ .
θ =
n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
(3)
Now θ > 1 =⇒
n∑
i=1
u1i >
n∑
i=1
u0i. Putting uˆi = θu0i = u0i
n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
in the
elements of T , (i.e., Ti = u1i − uˆi), we can write Ti = u1i − u0i
( n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
.
If
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Given
uˆi = u0i.
( n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
)
(4)
Furthermore, it is also given that
n∑
i=1
u1i >
n∑
i=1
u0i =⇒ uˆi > u0i. Since,
4 is satisfied it implies that the distributions Uˆ and U0 have same inequality,
following any relative inequality measure satisfying property 2. Furthermore,
from equation 4 we have
n∑
i=1
uˆi =
n∑
i=1
u1i Combining these three arguments
it is straightforward to write that Uˆ SPS U0 and Uˆ is also most efficient.
Q.E.D.
For an illustration of the SPS allocations consider U0 = {1, 2, 5, 12} and
U1 = {1, 1, 27, 111}. Following the proposed approach the most efficient SPS
allocation would be Uˆ = {7, 14, 35, 84}, whereas the associated tax transfer
vector is {6, 13, 8,−27}. In other words the first three individual receives
transfers, whereas the last individual pays tax. Note that the tax payer must
be a gainer from the initial to the final period. However, all the gainers are
not tax payers (3rd individual).
It is quite straightforward to show that there exists infinitely many SPS
allocations and associated tax transfer mechanisms. However, if we focus our
attention only on the most efficient SPS allocation then the counterfactual
allocation and eventually the associated tax transfer vector is unique. We
illustrate this formally in the following fashion:
Proposition 2. Given Proposition 1, the most efficient SPS allocation Uˆ
and the associated Tax transfer vector T is unique.
Proof: We begin with the assumption that there exists any arbitrary
T˜ = {T˜1, T˜2, .., T˜n} ∈ Rn associated with a counterfactual SPS allocation
Vˆ = {vˆ1, vˆ2, ..., vˆn} = {u11− T˜1, u12− T˜2, .., u1n− T˜n} ∈ Dn, such that T˜ 6= T .
Let us begin with the assumption that both Uˆ and Vˆ are most efficient SPS
allocation. Now any two vectors of the same order are related in the following
fashion: T˜ = T +  where  = {1, 2, .., n} ∈ Rn. Since T 6= T˜ =⇒ ∃i ∈
{1, 2, .., n} such that i 6= 0. Clearly, inequality in Vˆ is same as U0 following
2 if and only if ∃α(α ∈ R) such that i = αu0i, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., n}. Hence we
can write vˆi = u0i.
(
θ−α
)
, where θ =
n∑
i=1
u1i
n∑
i=1
u0i
. Clearly if α > 0 the allocation
is a feasible SPS but is not the most efficient. On the other hand if α < 0
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then
n∑
i=1
vˆi >
n∑
i=1
u1i =⇒ the allocation is not feasible and eventually is not
the most efficient. Hence, α = 0 =⇒ T ≡ T˜ and Uˆ ≡ Vˆ . Q.E.D.
Note that unlike SPS, uniqueness is not guaranteed for PS allocations. In
order to illustrate this we consider the following utility profiles: U0 = {1, 2, 3}
and U1 = {1.5, 2, 5.5}. Consider the following two counterfactual allocations:
U˜ = {1.5, 2.5, 5}, U¯ = {2.5, 3, 3.5}. Here both U˜ and U¯ are PS to their initial
distributions and both are most efficient.
In the formulation of the SPS we have considered the notion of relative
inequality measures. However, these results can also be extended to obtain a
unique most efficient SPS allocation which preserves absolute inequality i.e.,
family of measures which are translation invariant3 (see Kolm, 1976a,b, for
further details on absolute inequality measures).
3 Conclusion
We have extended the basic Pareto principle to focus on inequality-neutral or
distribution neutral Pareto superior allocation which we call strongly Pareto
superior or SPS allocation which guarantees higher individual welfare keeping
the degree of inequality same as before. We have shown that whenever there
is aggregate gain in the society we can compute a counterfactual distribution
obtained by taxing a subgroup of population and redistributing the collected
tax to the rest of the population such that the counterfactual allocation is
a SPS allocation. In the counterfactual distribution the aggregate gains of
utility has been redistributed among the individuals in the proportionate to
their utilities of the initial distribution. This keeps the inequality level same
and also ensures that the SPS is feasible and is the most efficient one.
Our approach retains the spirit of Pareto criterion but instead of keeping
the absolute level intact, we keep the inequality level the same. Any Pareto
superior allocation can be converted to a SPS allocation.
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